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DETERMINANTS OF TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS IN KOSOVO: AN EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE

1. Introduction

Public trust in political institutions is crucial for the proper functioning of the democratic, social and economic processes in a society. Citizen perceptions of public institutions are directly shaped by the output and performance of these institutions, while, in turn, increased trust generally supports and validates democratic legitimacy and institutional effectiveness.¹

Recently, the levels of trust in public institutions have been continuously declining in both developed and developing countries, in newly created democracies and well-established ones.² According to the 2017 Edelman Trust Barometer, citizens' trust in governments worldwide has broadly dropped. The level of trust in institutions is a direct indicator of representation, legitimacy and efficiency of the political and democratic institutions. Hence, increasing institutional trust is paramount especially for newly created regimes where distrust towards institutions is widespread, as it is in the majority of post-Communist countries in Eastern and Central Europe.³

Kosovo, as a newly independent country, has undergone many political transformations and democratic developments. Even though the international actors have transferred authority overtime to progressively increase the autonomy of national bodies, Kosovo's still fragile institutions continue struggling to function within the new political structures.⁴ In transitional countries, citizens generally express low levels of support and trust towards specific institutions and 'explicitly mistrust their executive institutions'.⁵ Kosovar citizens have a moderate level of trust in the international rule of law institutions, whereas they express lower levels of trust in local institutions, such as parliament and government.⁶ More precisely, Kosovars' low levels of trust in the parliament suggest that the latter does not sufficiently represent the society in Kosovo. In fact, the share of citizens who think that the parliament does not mirror Kosovo's society is around 41%, as expressed by a survey conducted in 2013.⁷ Another survey suggests that Kosovars, in general, are also not very satisfied with the government. More precisely, over 35% of the respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the government, and over 70% believed that its performance towards fighting corruption was poor and not effective.⁸

Given these findings, it is of crucial importance to further investigate and analyze factors which both positively and negatively affect the levels of trust in institutions, in order to identify and develop mechanisms for generating increased democratic and political trust in Kosovo. This

¹ Hetherington, M. J. (1998). The Political Relevance of Political Trust. *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 92:4. pp. 791-808.

² Van der Meer, T.W.G. (2017). Political Trust and the "Crises of Democracy. *Oxford Research Encyclopedias of Politics*. Oxford University Press USA

³ Dogan, M. and Higley, J. (1998). *Elites, Crises and the Origins of Regimes*. Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield. New York: Oxford

⁴ Camaj, L. (2014). Media Use and Political Trust in an Emerging Democracy: Setting the Institutional Trust Agenda in Kosovo. *International Journal of Communication*. Vol. 8. pp. 187-209

⁵ Miller, W. L., Koshechkina, T. Y., and Grodeland, A. B. (2004). Diffuse trust or diffuse analysis? The specificity of political distrust in post-communist Europe. in I. Markova (ed.), *Trust and democratic transition in post-communist Europe*. UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 133-156

⁶ Camaj, L. (2014). Media Use and Political Trust in an Emerging Democracy: Setting the Institutional Trust Agenda in Kosovo. *International Journal of Communication*. Vol. 8. pp. 187-209

⁷ The survey was conducted by the Democracy for Development, encompassing 952 responses from respondents in Kosovo, represents citizen's areas of concern. For more see: Democracy for Development. (2013). *Translation of Trust: Perception of Representation and Participation*. Prishtine.

⁸ The survey was conducted by Group for Legal and Political Studies in 2014 in cooperation with European Movement in Kosovo and it encompasses a national representative sample of 1097 respondents, capturing the entire territory of Kosovo and consists of twenty-two questions. The respondents were asked to express their opinion to several aspects of the Rule of Law institutions in Kosovo (Police, Court, Prosecution, EULEX, and Government)

empirical study will be structured as follows: Section II will examine theories on institutional trust from which various hypotheses will be established. Section III will concentrate on the employed methodology and will analyze data and variables of interest. Section IV will reflect on the diagnostics and fit of the model in order to assess the explanatory power of the established hypothesis. Section V will analyse the main findings of the multivariate analysis, while the last section will conclude by summarizing the most important findings relevant to Kosovo and will provide a set of recommendations which can contribute to policy-making geared towards generating higher levels of trust in institutions.

2. Theory and Hypothesis

During the last decade, research on institutional trust has attracted the interest of political scientists as well as policy makers. Yet, there are many gaps regarding the consequences and sources of political trust (and mistrust). According to the existing literature, trust in institutions has been based on two competing theories which offer differing ideas on how trust in democratic institutions is formed. *Cultural theories*, which highlight the exogenous determinants, state that institutional trust is shaped outside of the political bubble. More precisely, it originates from the 'cultural values and normative beliefs', as expressed by the interpersonal trust and national identification.⁹ Alternatively, *institutional theories* emphasize the politically endogenous determinants, wherein trust in institutions is expressed as a function of the utility of institutions' performance; the better the performance of institutions, the higher the level of trust in those institutions.¹⁰

Cultural and institutional theories can be further differentiated into micro and macro variations. According to micro theories, the assessment of institutions is based strictly on individuals 'experiences and tastes'; in such a scenario trust in institutions is strongly linked to individuals' experience with the institutions in the past which is then translated into trust/distrust in institutions.¹¹ As such, micro level theories suggest that trust might vary significantly between individuals according to their experience and taste.¹² Alternatively, macro theories argue that the response of individuals towards institutions is formed based on the performance of institutions; i.e. issues such as fighting corruption, promotion of economic growth, and amongst others, the effectiveness of public administration.

Based on the macro/institutional theory, this study will first hypothesize that citizens' trust in institutions is determined by individuals' perceptions towards government performance:

H1: The higher the individual's satisfaction with the government's work/performance, the higher the individual's level of trust in institutions.

According to the institutional theory, individuals' trust towards institutions is strongly based on the output and efficiency of institutions, which can also be evaluated within the context of democratic

⁹ Godefroidt, A., Langer, A., and Meuleman, B. (2015). Developing political trust in a developing country. Centre for Research on Peace and Development (CRPD). KU Leuven

¹⁰ Mishler, W. and Rose, R. (2001). "What Are the Origins of Political Trust? Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-communist Societies". *Comparative Political Studies*. Vol. 34. No.1. pp. 30-62; See also: Putnam, R.D., Leonardi, R. and Nanetti, R.Y. (1994). *Making Democracy Work*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

¹¹ Rolef, S.H. (2006). Public Trust in Parliament: A comparative study. *The Knesset Information Division*. Jerusalem. pp. 1-60; See also: Mishler, W. and Rose, R. (2001). "What Are the Origins of Political Trust? Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-communist Societies". *Comparative Political Studies*. Vol. 34. No.1. pp. 30-62

¹² Rolef, S.H. (2006). Public Trust in Parliament: A comparative study. *The Knesset Information Division*. Jerusalem. pp. 1-60

functioning.¹³ Several studies have highlighted that institutional legitimacy is strongly linked with the democratic legitimacy; hence, citizen perceptions of institutions may also be expressed through citizen perceptions of democratic functioning.¹⁴ Kosovo, as a transitional country, has undergone many transformational reforms in order to create a democratic state. Therefore we hypothesize that the perceptions and satisfaction of individuals with the domestic democratic state is positively correlated with the level of trust in institutions.¹⁵

H2: Citizen perceptions regarding the functioning of democracy in one's country is positively correlated with the level of trust one has for institutions. The higher the perception of individuals towards the level of democracy, the higher the individual's level of trust in institutions.

It has also been argued that political trust is often judged by the country's economic state.¹⁶ Supposedly, the citizens of countries with good economic performance, judged on the basis of sound economic development, low unemployment rates, and steady economic growth, seem to have a higher level of trust in institutions.¹⁷ On the other hand, low levels of economic development have been shown to negatively affect citizen perceptions of institutions and their legitimacy.¹⁸ These arguments are important when considering Kosovo's case, which is characterized by poor economic performance, high unemployment rates, high trade deficits and extreme poverty. Hence, it is important to explore how economic development in Kosovo might affect its citizens' level of trust in the institutions,¹⁹ leading to the following hypothesis:

H3: The higher the county's level of economic development, the higher the individual's trust in institutions.

Citizens' trust in institutions is strongly linked with the evaluation and assessment of policy, social, political and/or economical. By casting their vote, citizens have the power to dismiss parliament representatives (MPs, party coalitions) and/or extend their mandate; the choice to cast a vote in favor of or against a specific party or politician is partly based on the fulfillment of programs and promises. Citizens who perceive the parliament efficient and devoted towards fulfilling its promises, and thus vote in favor of the ruling coalition, are expected to have a higher level of trust in parliament.²⁰ Thus, we hypothesize that citizens who have voted for the ruling parties in the previous election hold a higher level of trust in institutions:

H4: Individuals who voted for the position during the last parliamentary elections have a higher level of trust in institutions compared to those who voted for the opposition.

¹³ Arnold, C., Sapir, E. V., and Zapryanova, G. (2012). Trust in the institutions of the European Union: A cross-country examination. *European Integration online Papers*, Vol.16. Issue.2:8

¹⁴ Klingemann, H., 1999. Mapping political support in the 1990s: A global analysis. In P. Norris. ed.1999. *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 31-57

¹⁵ Arnold, C., Sapir, E. V., and Zapryanova, G. (2012). Trust in the institutions of the European Union: A cross-country examination. *European Integration online Papers*, Vol.16. Issue.2:8

¹⁶ McAllister, I. (1999). The economic performance of governments. in P. Norris (ed.) *Critical Citizens: Global support for democratic government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

¹⁷ Miller, A. and Listhaug, O.b(1999). Political performance and institutional trust. in P. Norris (ed.) *Critical Citizens: Global support for democratic government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

¹⁸ Przeworski, A., Alvarez,M., Cheibub,J.A. and Limongi, F. (1996). What makes democracies endure?. *Journal of Democracy*. Vol. 7:1. pp. 39-55

¹⁹ USAID. (2008). Kosovo: Economic performance assessment. Produced by Nathan Associates Inc. for review by the United States Agency for International Development. Available at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADL767.pdf

²⁰ Meer, T.V.D. and Dekker, P. (2010). Trustworthy states, trusting citizens? A multi level study into objective and subjective determinants of political trust. in: *Political Trust: Why context Matters*. pp. 95-116

Countries with high levels of freedom generally foster higher levels of trust in institutions.²¹ In particular, scholars suggest that there are some variables correlated with freedom, and by extension democratic standards, which have an impact on public trust in institutions. First, free and fair elections (and electoral institutions) play a crucial role in forming trust in political institutions.²² Distrust in electoral and election process can negatively affect citizen perceptions of democratic institutions.²³ Second, media and freedom of expression also play a crucial role on the overall process of democratization and public perceptions of institutions.²⁴ More precisely, freedom of expression and free media are prerequisites for a healthy democracy, especially in early stages of democratic transition.²⁵ The results of a survey suggest that Kosovar citizens consider media as one of the most trusted informational channels, more precisely television, newspapers and online portals.²⁶ Thus, free media tends to increase trust in democratic functioning and perhaps, by extension, democratic institutions. Lastly, in those countries where there is freedom of speech, the governments perform better.²⁷ Hence, based on the theoretical background outlined above, we hypothesize:

H5a: The more individuals believe elections to be free and fair, the more trust they have in institutions.

H5b: The more individuals believe the media is free, the more trust they have in institutions.

H5c: Individuals who feel free to express their political views, even if extreme ones, have a higher level of trust in institutions.

Institutions should have the capacity to provide for a fair and inclusive society. This can be achieved through “‘fairness-generating institutions’ [which] must enshrine concepts such as fairness, justice, incorruptibility, non-partisanship, truthfulness, or even transparency as the core norms of communal living... they are universally oriented and provide their citizens with equal opportunities”.²⁸ In line with this argument, political trust is highly determined by the behavior of institutions and whether these institutions treat their residents, including citizens, immigrants or minorities, fairly, justly, and equally.²⁹ Empirical evidence suggests that sometimes immigrants and minorities have less trust in institutions of the country in which they reside.³⁰ In Kosovo, ethnic

²¹ Mishler, W. and Rose, R. (2001). “What Are the Origins of Political Trust? Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-communist Societies”. *Comparative Political Studies*. Vol. 34. No.1. pp. 30-62

²² Birch, S. (2010). Perceptions of Electoral Fairness and Voter Turnout. *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol.43:12. pp. 1601–1622

²³ Lehoucq, F.E. and Molina, I. (2002). *Stuffing the Ballot-Box: Fraud, Electoral Reform, and Democratization in Costa Rica*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

²⁴ Pasek, J. (2006). Fueling or following democracy? Analyzing the role of media liberalization in democratic transition. Annual American Political Science Association Conference. Philadelphia

²⁵ Camaj, L. (2014). Media Use and Political Trust in an Emerging Democracy: Setting the Institutional Trust Agenda in Kosovo. *International Journal of Communication*. Vol. 8. pp. 187–209

²⁶ UBO Consulting. (2014). Survey of Awareness of the EU and European Integration in Kosovo. Prishtine. Available at: [http://www.meiks.net/repository/docs/2014_Survey_of_Awareness_of_the_EU_and_European_Integration_in_Kosovo_\[EUPK\]_\(Final\)\[1\].pdf](http://www.meiks.net/repository/docs/2014_Survey_of_Awareness_of_the_EU_and_European_Integration_in_Kosovo_[EUPK]_(Final)[1].pdf)

²⁷ OECD. (2015). Building more effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions for all. *OECD AND post-2015 Reflections*. Element 6, Paper 1

²⁸ Freitag, M. and Bühlmann, M. (2009). Crafting trust: The role of political institutions in a comparative perspective. *Comparative Political Studies*. Vol. 42:12. pp. 1537-1566

²⁹ Roder, A. and Muhlau, P. (2010). Discrimination, Exclusion and Immigrants: Confidence in Public Institutions in Europe. *Institute for International Integration Studies*. IIS Discussion Paper. No. 320

³⁰ Ibid.

minorities and their social integration remains a very sensitive issue, which might negatively affect minority populations' perceptions of institutions, leading to the following hypothesis:

H6a: Individuals who are citizens of Kosovo have a higher level of trust towards institutions than those who reside in but are not citizens of Kosovo.

H6b: Individuals who belong to minority groups have a lower level of trust towards institutions than those who do not belong to any minority group.

A finer-grained analysis of trust in institutions might reveal significant variance amongst individuals based on their socio-demographic characteristics, such as educational level, family background, gender, age, and amongst others, income level. Some studies suggest that individuals with higher educational attainments have more trust in institutions than those with lower educational attainment.³¹ Whereas other studies have found that education does not appear to be a significant factor in predicting trust in institutions in post-communist societies³² or is negatively associated with trust in institutions in European counties.³³ According to a recent survey conducted in Kosovo, 40% of the respondents with higher educational levels think that parliament does not mirror the society, i.e. reflect and represent the society.³⁴

With regard to gender, empirical evidences are inconclusive as well. Some studies have found that gender has little influence on trust in institutions,³⁵ whereas other studies have found that women tend to have in some cases lower and in other cases higher trust in institutions.³⁶ Similarly, the empirical evidence on the significance of income-level is inconclusive. Some findings have suggested that personal income levels do not affect individuals' trust in institutions,³⁷ while other results suggest that individuals with higher income-levels might be more satisfied with institutions than those with lower income-levels.³⁸ This study will include socio-demographic control variables in an effort to understand their impact on levels of trust in institutions in Kosovo and to contribute to the empirical gaps in the literature. However, this study will not develop hypotheses related to these socio-demographic variables given they do not fall within the scope of this study.

3. Methodology

This empirical study will employ data from the European Social Survey, which measures beliefs, behavior patterns and attitudes of populations in more than thirty nations. Given that no recent ESS data is available for Kosovo, this study employs data from the sixth round of the ESS survey

³¹ Meer, T.V.D. (2010). In what we trust? A multi-level study into trust in parliament as an evaluation of state characteristics. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*. Vol. 76:3. pp. 517-536

³² Mishler, W. and Rose, R. (2001). "What Are the Origins of Political Trust? Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-communist Societies". *Comparative Political Studies*. Vol. 34. No.1. pp. 30-62

³³ Arnold, C. Eliyahu V. S. and Zapryanova, G. (2012). Trust in the institutions of the European Union: A cross-country examination', in: Beaudonnet, Laurie and Danilo Di Mauro (eds) 'Beyond Euro-skepticism: Understanding attitudes towards the EU', *European Integration online Papers (EIOP)*, Special Mini-Issue 2, Vol. 16, Article 8, <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2012-008a.htm>

³⁴ Democracy for Development. (2013). Translation of Trust: Perception of Representation and Participation. Pristine. Available at: http://d4d-ks.org/assets/D4D_Elections_6_ENG_WEB1.pdf

³⁵ Newton, K. and Norris, P. (2000). Confidence in Public Institutions: Faith, Culture, or Performance?" in Susan J. and Robert D. Putnam, eds., *Disaffected Democracies*, Princeton New Jersey, Princeton University Press, pp. 52-73

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Mishler, W. and Rose, R. (2001). "What Are the Origins of Political Trust? Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-communist Societies". *Comparative Political Studies*. Vol. 34. No.1. pp. 30-62

³⁸ Meer, T.V.D. (2010). In what we trust? A multi-level study into trust in parliament as an evaluation of state characteristics. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*. Vol. 76:3. pp. 517-536

conducted in 2012/2013. The restricted sample, composed of 307 respondents, is representative of the entire country's population over the age of 15, regardless of citizenship or nationality.

This study uses trust in institutions as the independent variable. The analysis will elaborate specifically on the levels of trust in the parliament, the legal system, political parties as well as politicians. According to the ESS survey, the questions regarding the trust in institutions are based on a 0-10 Likert-scale measurement, where 0 represents no trust in institutions and 10 represents full trust in institutions.

In order to construct a general variable which measures the overall trust in institutions, all questions on institutional trust were grouped, from which an overall trust-index was created, ranging from 0 to 40. As noted previously, we will employ five dependent variables related to trust in institutions, measuring the overall trust in institutions, trust in the parliament, trust in political parties, trust in politicians, and trust in the legal system, respectively. We also employ two dummy variables - whether individuals voted for the ruling party(ies) and whether individuals felt discriminated against - which take the values of 0 or 1. Regarding the latter variable, the literature suggests that discrimination of any kind plays an important role in the process of shaping trust in institutions.³⁹ Other independent variables – which measure how democratic the country is, the satisfaction of respondents with the economic status and the work/performance of the government, how free the elections are, perceptions of and trust in media, as well as how free the respondents feel to express their political views – also have explanatory power vis-à-vis trust in institutions and are constructed on a Likert-scale from 0 to 10.

The other independent variables employed are socio-economic control variables shown to correlate with trust in institutions, such as gender, age, religion, education, citizenship, ethnicity, and income status. The tables below include a description of each of the variables used in the multivariate analysis and the summary statistics of these variables.

Table 1 : Description of Variables

Variable	Description
Trust Index	Respondents' level of trust in institutions
Trust in Parliament	Respondents' level of trust in the Parliament
Trust in Politicians	Respondents' level of trust in Politicians
Trust in Political Parties	Respondents' level of trust in Political Parties
Trust in the Legal System	Respondents' level of trust in the Legal System
Performance of the Government	Respondents' perception towards the performance of government
Democratic Country	Respondents' perception on how democratic is Kosovo
Economic Development	Respondents' perception on the current economic state
Voted for ruling party(ies)	The respondent voted for the ruling party(ies)
Free & Fair Elections	Respondents' perception on how free the general elections are
Media Freedom	Respondents' perception on media freedom

³⁹ Roder, A. and Muhlau, P. (2010). Discrimination, Exclusion and Immigrants: Confidence in Public Institutions in Europe. *Institute for International Integration Studies*. IIIS Discussion Paper. No. 320

Freedom of Political Expression	Respondents' freedom to express their political opinions
Feelings of Discrimination	The respondent is subject to discrimination from any group
Citizen of Kosovo	Respondent is a citizen of Kosovo
Minority Status	Respondent belongs to an ethnic minority group
Gender	Respondents' gender
Age	Respondents' age
Religion	Respondent belongs to a religion group
Income	Income group
Need for Additional Income	Respondents need additional income for their daily expenses
Education	Respondents' educational level

Table 2: Summary Statistics

Variables	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Overall Trust	9.13	9.26	0	40
Trust in Parliament	2.59	2.78	0	10
Trust in the Legal System	2.68	2.86	0	10
Trust in Political Parties	1.97	2.53	0	10
Trust in Politicians	1.86	2.48	0	10
Democratic Country	4.11	2.95	0	10
Economic State	5.48	3.36	0	10
Performance of the Government	6.12	3.31	0	10
Free & Fair Elections	3.35	3.13	0	10
Media Freedom	5.18	3.44	0	10
Freedom of Political Expression	5.50	3.03	0	10
Age	43.08	17.1	16	89
Income	3.56	2.06	0	10
Education	1.69	0.68	1	4
	n(=0)	n(=1)	Min	Max
Gender	0.49	0.51	0	1
Religion	0.29	0.71	0	1
Need for Additional Income	0.51	0.49	0	1
Citizen of Kosovo	0.18	0.82	0	1
Minority Status	0.87	0.13	0	1
Feelings of Discrimination	0.87	0.13	0	1
Voted for Ruling Party(ies)	0.65	0.35	0	1

The multivariate model employed in this study is an OLS regression model used to estimate the effect that the variables of interest might have on the level of trust towards institutions. We employ five models, presented below:

Trust in Institutions = $\beta_0 + \beta_1$ Government Performance + β_2 Democratic Country + β_3 Economic Development + β_4 Voted for Position + β_5 Fair&Free Elections + β_6 Free Media + β_7 Freedom of Political Expression + β_8 Discriminated + β_{9-16} Socio-economic variables

Trust in Parliament = $\beta_0 + \beta_1$ Government Performance + β_2 Democratic Country + β_3 Economic Development + β_4 Voted for Position + β_5 Fair&Free Elections + β_6 Free Media + β_7 Freedom of Political Expression + β_8 Discriminated + β_{9-16} Socio-economic variables

Trust in Politicians = $\beta_0 + \beta_1$ Government Performance + β_2 Democratic Country + β_3 Economic Development + β_4 Voted for Position + β_5 Fair&Free Elections + β_6 Free Media + β_7 Freedom of Political Expression + β_8 Discriminated + β_{9-16} Socio-economic variables

Trust in Political Parties = $\beta_0 + \beta_1$ Government Performance + β_2 Democratic Country + β_3 Economic Development + β_4 Voted for Position + β_5 Fair&Free Elections + β_6 Free Media + β_7 Freedom of Political Expression + β_8 Discriminated + β_{9-16} Socio-economic variables

Trust in the Legal System = $\beta_0 + \beta_1$ Government Performance + β_2 Democratic Country + β_3 Economic Development + β_4 Voted for Position + β_5 Fair&Free Elections + β_6 Free Media + β_7 Freedom of Political Expression + β_8 Discriminated + β_{9-16} Socio-economic variables

4. Diagnostics and Model-Fit

Prior to analysing the results from the multivariate analysis, this section will initially concentrate on the diagnostics of the models employed in this study in order to assess the explanatory power of the established hypotheses.

The diagnostic tests reveal that the models used in this study are specified correctly. The link-test⁴⁰ shows that the models employed in this study are well specified; they do not suffer from omission of variables and are not subject to a link error, as shown by the insignificant squared predicted value. Regarding the multicollinearity, the variance inflation factor (VIF) shows that the independent variables are not highly correlated. More specifically, all the VIF values are below two (2) which satisfies the assumption of no multicollinearity due to the absence of moderate linear relationship in the regressors.⁴¹ In addition, the residuals were carefully investigated where no extreme or mild outliers were found, which are considered as the usual source of non-normality, in

⁴⁰ Link-test initially estimates the original model and then in the second step refits two new variables: the model's linear predicted value and the linear predicted value squared. In case the model is properly specified and does not suffer from variable omission, the linear predicted value squared in the model should be insignificant (UCLA: Statistical Consulting Group 2011).

⁴¹ Gujarati, D. (2004). *Basic Econometrics*. (4th ed.), New York: McGraw Hill, p. 344–345. See also: Kutner, M.H. (2005). *Applied Linear Statistical Models* (5th ed.). *The McGraw-Hill/Irwin Series Operations and Decision Sciences*. Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin, according to which the VIF values should be below the critical value of ten for the multi-collinearity assumption to be satisfied.

a regression.⁴² Apart from the model specification, this study also assesses the model-fit of multivariate analysis based on the R^2 values, which range between 19.3% and 31.2%. Given these findings, the multivariate model has a satisfactory model fit.⁴³

Moreover, in checking the robustness of the multivariate model, the regressions were estimated more than once; each time, a different control variable was dropped. The variables of interest remained robust when dropping regressors, which indicates structural validity of the model.⁴⁴ Lastly, the Robust Standard Errors were used to adjust the models for heteroscedasticity.

5. Results

This section presents the results of the multivariate models, their explanatory power towards the set hypotheses, and prospects for future research. The estimated results from the multivariate models employed in this study are summarized in Table 3. The proportion of variance explained by the models, as portrayed by the R-squared measure, ranges between 19.3% and 31.2%. This suggests that Model I, overall trust in institutions, supplies the best prediction and explanation of overall trust over the mean model, whereas Model IV, trust in legal system, supplies the lowest prediction and explanation of overall trust in institutions.

Regarding the overall trust in institutions, the results suggest that there is no strong support for the first hypothesis (H1). More precisely, the government performance variable does not significantly affect citizens' trust in institutions considered in this study. Results suggest that government performance coefficients are not significant to explain the level of trust in institutions (parliament, politicians, and political parties).

Multivariate results provide strong support for the second hypothesis (H2). The estimated coefficients are highly significant across all 5 models implying that the higher the perception of individuals regarding the degree of democracy in Kosovo, the higher their level of trust in institutions. More precisely, when citizens' perceived level of democracy increases by 8 scale points, the overall trust index increases by 1 scale point, *ceteris paribus*. Regarding citizen trust in different institutions, the relationship between the perceived level of democracy in Kosovo is also positive and quite similar for each institution. In the context of democratic functioning, it can be assumed that Kosovars perceive institutions as efficient in implementing the transformational reforms needed for the creation and proper-functioning of the democratic state.

The multivariate coefficients strongly reject the third hypotheses (H3), implying that the economic state and its development does not contribute towards shaping institutional trust and does not determine citizen trust in Kosovo's institutions. A similar empirical study, conducted in 26 countries, also found that a state's economic development does not determine the level of public trust in institutions.⁴⁵ However, other studies did find a positive correlation between economic development and trust in institutions, as well as between economic equality and levels

⁴² Wooldridge, J. M. (2009). *Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach*. Third Edition. Mason, OH: Thomson South-Western; Moreover, since our sample is relatively large, we can rely on the Central Limit Theorem which states that OLS estimators satisfy asymptotic normality in large samples. This theorem enables us to use the t and F statistics when interpreting the OLS estimators because it assumes that non-normality will not invalidate statistical inference (pp. 174 and 759).

⁴³ R-squared provides the improvement level comparing the complete model to the null-model with all coefficients except of the constant being zero. In general, if the R-squared values range between 0.2 and 0.4, then the model can be considered a good model fit and adequate.

⁴⁴ White, H. & Lu, X. (2010). *Robustness Checks and Robustness Tests in Applied Economics*. UCSD Department of Economics. Discussion Paper, p. 3

⁴⁵ Meer, T.V.D. (2010). In what we trust? A multi-level study into trust in parliament as an evaluation of state characteristics. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*. Vol. 76:3. pp. 517-536

of trust.⁴⁶ As such, including more control variables relating to economic development in future research might further shed light on the correlation between the country's economic state and trust in institutions in Kosovo.

The results moderately supported H4, however only across Models I, II and IV. Individuals who voted for the ruling party(ies) during the previous parliamentary elections tend to trust the institutions more, compared to the individuals who did not vote for the ruling parties. Furthermore, individuals who voted for the ruling party(ies) expressed a higher level of trust towards the parliament, and political parties although to a lesser extent, compared to those who voted for the opposition. These results could suggest that those who voted for the ruling parties (35% of the sample), approve of the social/economic/political performance of these parties,⁴⁷ and are, in turn, more satisfied with the parliament, political parties, and institutions in general.

As discussed earlier, free and fair elections hold an important role in shaping trust in political institutions. As expected, the results strongly support hypothesis H5a; the estimated coefficients are highly significant at all conventional levels across all models, suggesting that the proper-functioning of the electoral system plays an important role on determining citizens' trust towards institutions in general. In proportional systems such as in Kosovo, the theory suggests that individuals tend to trust most in the parliament since most of their preferences are translated into parliament via elections.⁴⁸ Regarding the free media and freedom of political expression, H5b and H5c, results suggest that perceptions of a free media positively correlate to levels of overall trust in institutions at a 10% significance level, and trust in legal system at 5% significance level, while freedom of political expression is positively correlated with the level of trust in political parties at a 5% significance level, *ceteris paribus*.

According to the results, hypotheses H6a and H6b are not supported across all models. Being a citizen of Kosovo correlates with institutional trust only with regard to the overall trust index, trust in parliament, and trust in legal system at 5 %, 10% and 1% significance levels, respectively. On the other hand, being a minority in Kosovo does not have any significant correlation with levels of overall trust in institutions. However, contrary to expectations, being a minority and level of trust in parliament are positively correlated, although only at a 10% significance level.

Regarding the socio-economic control variables, their effects on shaping trust in institutions varies substantially across all models. It is surprising that the age of individuals and religion do not seem to have any major significant effect on shaping overall trust in institutions. Only at a 10% significance level, age is positively correlated with trust in political parties and religion is positively correlated with trust in parliament. Similarly, individuals' educational level is positively correlated, at a 10% significance level, only with trust in legal system. Another result worth mentioning is that women in Kosovo tend to have less trust in institutions in general, and specifically in parliament and politicians. Similar findings suggest that women in European countries trust institutions (European Parliament and Commission) less, compared to men.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Farrell, H. (2009). Institutions and Mid-Level Explanations of Trust. in: *Whom can we Trust? How Groups, Networks and Institutions make trust possible?*. Russel Sage Foundation. New York. pp. 127-148

⁴⁷ Anderson. C.J. & Guillory C.A. (1997). Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-national Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems. *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 91:1. pp. 66-81

⁴⁸ Norris, P. (1999). Institutional explanations for political support. In: Norris P (ed.) *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 217-235; See also: Magalhaes, P. (2006). Confidence in parliaments: Performance, representation and accountability. In: Torcal M and Montero JR (eds) *Political Disaffection in Contemporary Democracies: Social Capital, Institutions and Politics*. London: Routledge. pp.190-214

⁴⁹ Arnold, C. Elyahu V. S. and Zapryanova, G. (2012). Trust in the institutions of the European Union: A cross-country examination', in: Beaudonnet, Laurie and Danilo Di Mauro (eds) 'Beyond Euro-skepticism: Understanding attitudes towards the EU', *European Integration online Papers (EIoP)*, Special Mini-Issue 2, Vol. 16, Article 8, <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2012-008a.htm>

Lastly, contrary to expectations, feelings of discrimination amongst respondents had no significant effect on their trust in institutions. There was also no correlation between income level and trust in institutions. However, it should be noted that individuals in need of additional income were less trusting of politicians, as suggested by the negative coefficient at a 10% significance level. This is unsurprising given Kosovo has the lowest level of per capita income in the Balkan region, with many households dependent on remittances; thus, some individuals may blame politicians for this persistent economic reality.

To conclude, the results suggest that variables such as the perceived level of democracy, free and fair elections, as well as voting for the ruling party(ies) during the last parliamentary elections seem to most strongly correlate with citizens' levels of trust in institutions. Whereas, the effect and significance of the other variables employed in the study varies between all five models.

Table 3: Multivariate Regression Results

Models →	I	II	III	IV	V
	Overall Trust Index	Trust in Parliament	Trust in Politicians	Trust in Political Parties	Trust in Legal System
Variables ↓					
Performance of the Government	-0.108 (0.133)	-0.031 (0.050)	0.016 (0.038)	0.004 (0.040)	-0.098** (0.046)
Democratic Country	0.806*** (0.206)	0.231*** (0.064)	0.240*** (0.056)	0.193*** (0.063)	0.141** (0.064)
Economic Development	0.093 (0.133)	0.032 (0.050)	0.041 (0.037)	0.018 (0.042)	0.0004 (0.046)
Voted for Ruling Party(ies)	2.062** (1.035)	0.879** (0.338)	0.493 (0.311)	0.534* (0.319)	0.154 (0.358)
Free & Fair Elections	0.735*** (0.175)	0.196*** (0.058)	0.170*** (0.049)	0.193*** (0.055)	0.175*** (0.058)
Media Freedom	0.234* (0.131)	0.061 (0.051)	0.057 (0.038)	0.021 (0.043)	0.094** (0.047)
Freedom of Political Expression	0.176 (0.151)	0.064 (0.052)	0.026 (0.044)	0.100** (0.050)	-0.014 (0.056)
Feelings of Discrimination	-0.609 (1.537)	-0.084 (0.497)	0.073 (0.494)	0.135 (0.598)	-0.734 (0.461)
Citizens of Kosovo	4.182** (1.850)	1.380* (0.742)	0.714 (0.469)	0.564 (0.513)	1.523*** (0.566)
Minority Status	2.217 (2.032)	1.206* (0.684)	0.245 (0.543)	0.129 (0.642)	0.636 (0.827)
Gender	-1.783* (0.966)	-0.826*** (0.313)	-0.481* (0.267)	-0.183 (0.280)	-0.291 (0.359)

Age	0.037 (0.033)	0.017 (0.010)	0.014 (0.009)	0.016* (0.009)	-0.011 (0.011)
Religion	-0.157 (1.608)	0.175* (0.0990)	-0.195 (0.448)	-0.055 (0.526)	-0.457 (0.767)
Income	-0.109 (0.231)	0.037 (0.081)	-0.091 (0.067)	-0.039 (0.069)	-0.0153 (0.080)
Need for Additional Income	-0.962 (0.336)	-0.141 (0.314)	-0.506* (0.293)	0.127 (0.320)	-0.441 (0.320)
Education	0.424 (0.563)	0.173 (0.242)	-0.008 (0.204)	0.387* (0.210)	-0.127 (0.290)
R-squared	0.312	0.254	0.266	0.221	0.193
Standard Errors in parenthesis Robust Standard Errors are used to adjust for Heteroscedasticity ***, **, * represent the significance level at all conventional levels, at 5% and at 10%, respectively					

6. Conclusion

Recently, many countries have concentrated on strengthening relations with their citizens given decreasing participation rates in elections and political party membership and due to low levels of trust in institutions.⁵⁰ According to the existing literature, economic development, socio-economic status, satisfaction with life and democratic functioning were found to be some of the most important determinants for generating trust in institutions in European countries,⁵¹ whereas in Kosovo's case, the literature and data on such phenomena is scarce. Thus, the main aim of this paper is to contribute to the empirical evidence on institutional trust in Kosovo, as well as to shed light on the factors which contribute towards shaping trust in institutions. The empirical model employed in this study is a multivariate OLS regression model used to estimate the effect that the variables of interest might have on determining the level of trust towards institutions.

The data used in this study were retrieved from the European Social Survey (6th round) conducted in Kosovo during 2012/2013. Even though this study employs the most recent ESS data for Kosovo, it should be noted that the findings are a reflection of 2012-2013 citizen trust in institutions. Nonetheless, due to a lack of drastic shifts in the political and economic landscape in the last five years in Kosovo, one cannot expect significant changes of citizen trust in institutions during this period. Ideally, the ESS will follow-up with a new European Social Survey for Kosovo, which will be used to corroborate these findings with current data.

The results of this study suggest that the perceived level of democracy in the country, free and fair elections, as well as voting for the ruling party(ies) during parliamentary elections seem to

⁵⁰ Rolef, S.H. (2006). Public Trust in Parliament: A comparative study. *The Knesset Information Division*. Jerusalem. pp. 1-60

⁵¹ Arnold, C., Sapir, E. V., and Zapryanova, G. (2012). Trust in the institutions of the European Union: A cross-country examination. *European Integration online Papers*, Vol.16. Issue.2:8

largely determine citizens' levels of trust in institutions. Bearing in mind that public trust is vital for democratic and political legitimacy, it is paramount to consider introducing specific policies and/or altering the existing ones in order to increase citizens' trust in and improve their perceptions of public institutions. With regard to the functioning of democracy in Kosovo, institutions should continue introducing and implementing economic, social, and political policies which strengthen and ensure proper democratic functioning. This would, in turn, lead to enhanced democratic legitimacy and consequently increased levels of trust in institutions.

Regarding free and fair elections, which also seem to be positively correlated with trust in institutions, Kosovo's parliamentary elections in 2014 and 2017 were reported to be free, transparent and well-organized.⁵² Based on the findings in this study, we expect that this had a positive effect on citizen perceptions of the performance of political institutions and strengthened political legitimacy. In order to make comparisons between the effects of the 2010 parliamentary elections (those considered in this study) and the parliamentary elections of 2014 and 2017, future research should empirically test the aforementioned relationship by employing new data and analyzing the shifting or continued effects of free and fair elections on institutional trust.

Results also suggest that individuals who voted for the ruling parties in the parliamentary elections of 2010 expressed higher levels of trust in institutions, particularly in the parliament and political parties, than those who voted for the opposition. In general, in order to build and maintain public trust, Kosovo's government should be more transparent and accountable, should follow a proactive approach towards sensitive issues and holistically tackle problems undermining the rule of law.

Bearing in mind the political vacuum after the parliamentary elections in 2014 and the voting shifts after the parliamentary election in 2017⁵³, the relationship between voting behavior and institutional trust should be statistically tested again in order to reevaluate and compare citizen perceptions of parliament and political parties.

Considering the finding that women in Kosovo, compared to men, express less trust in public institutions in general and in parliament and politicians, socially inclusive reforms tailored to women, especially labour market reforms, should be introduced in order to achieve gender equality and consequently improve the negative perceptions of women towards institutions in Kosovo.

While the results suggest that economic development is not significant in determining levels of trust in institutions, Kosovo should promote its economic growth policies in order to generate development and increase the employment rate which amounted to only 28.0% for year 2016.⁵⁴ Such initiatives would also increase citizen's level of income which, according to the results, did appear to affect levels of trust in parliament. Moreover, this study found that individuals in need of additional income to cover their daily expenses expressed lower levels of trust in institutions; hence, economic growth and higher levels of income would improve citizens' standard

⁵² European Union Election Observation. Accessed on: 22/07/2014. Available at: http://www.eueom.eu/files/pressreleases/english/eueom-kosovo-press-release-09062014_en.pdf

⁵³ After the 2014 parliamentary elections, the inability to constitute the Assembly for almost half a year led to an institutional malfunction and a wave of economic, social and political crises, which persisted even after the government was created. Following many failures of the ruling coalition (PDK and LDK) among which also the massive migration waves of Kosovans to EU countries, the opposition launched a no-confidence motion in 2017 accusing the Assembly Cabinet of not being able to meet its obligations. After losing the vote, the parliament was dismissed, paving the way for the Snap Elections in 2017. The post – 2017 election atmosphere in Kosovo was characterized with an unusual turn, as attested by unexpected results. According to preliminary results, PDK and its coalition secured (AAK, NISMA and other small political parties) 33,92%, followed by VV with 27,16%, and the coalition LDK, AKR and Alternativa with 25,79%. It's worth mentioning that VV, compared to previous elections of 2014, shifted in the second place by doubling its number of votes.

⁵⁴ Kosovo Agency of Statistics. (2017). Results of the Kosovo 2016 Labour Force Survey

of living, minimize need for additional income, and, in turn, could positively shift citizen perceptions of the performance of institutions and trust in public institutions in Kosovo.

To conclude, the results from the multivariate analysis scientifically contribute to better understanding of citizens' levels of trust in institutions as well as enrich the empirical and theoretical literature regarding this phenomenon in Kosovo. Lastly, such results can be considered as a foundation for future research, and for policy makers to identify the policies and practices necessary for generating higher levels of trust in public institutions in Kosovo.

APPENDICES

Diagnostic Tests

Heteroscedasticity

Breusch–Pagan Test

Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity

Ho: Constant variance

Variables: fitted values of trustindex

chi2(1) = 26.80

Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Multicolloniarity

Variance Inflation Factor

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
minority	1.99	0.501351
religion	1.92	0.520123
democratic~y	1.51	0.661018
income	1.43	0.701646
educ	1.42	0.703101
electionsf~e	1.41	0.711214
citizenkos~o	1.40	0.715607
freemedia	1.39	0.721360
govperform	1.34	0.744427
economicst~e	1.31	0.761729
addincome	1.31	0.765993
voteffor	1.29	0.776288
discrimina~d	1.22	0.820195
age	1.21	0.827935
politicalf~m	1.21	0.827990
gender	1.21	0.829304
domicil	1.13	0.882599
Mean VIF	1.39	


Normality of Residuals

Shapiro-Wilk Test


Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data

Variable	Obs	W	V	z	Prob>z
-----+-----					
r	307	0.96257	8.140	4.927	0.00000


Kernel Density Estimator




Pnorm



Qnorm



Histogram



Model Specification

Link Test

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs = 307		
Model	7313.44379	2	3656.72189	F(2, 304)	=	69.26
Residual	16049.3836	304	52.7940249	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	23362.8274	306	76.349109	R-squared	=	0.3130
				Adj R-squared	=	0.3085
				Root MSE	=	7.2659

trustindex	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
_hat	.9099301	.2996493	3.04	0.003	.3202807	1.499579
_hatsq	.0043962	.0140249	0.31	0.754	-.0232019	.0319943
_cons	.3553718	1.461697	0.24	0.808	-2.520953	3.231696

Multivariate Regression Results

Overall Trust in Institutions

Linear regression	Number of obs = 307		
	F(16, 290)	=	10.78
	Prob > F	=	0.0000
	R-squared	=	0.3128
	Root MSE	=	7.4405

trustindex	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
gender	-1.783498	.9661192	-1.85	0.066	-3.684993	.1179962
age	.0376189	.0333995	1.13	0.261	-.0281173	.1033551
religion	-.1570779	1.608966	-0.10	0.922	-3.323809	3.009653
income	-.1090083	.2311549	-0.47	0.638	-.5639622	.3459456
addincome	-.9620522	.99751	-0.96	0.336	-2.925329	1.001225
citizenkos~o	4.182562	1.85052	2.26	0.025	.5404095	7.824714
minority	2.217606	2.032307	1.09	0.276	-1.782336	6.217547
educ	.4248547	.7328441	0.58	0.563	-1.017513	1.867222
discrimina~d	-.6091701	1.537354	-0.40	0.692	-3.634956	2.416616
voteffor	2.062002	1.035282	1.99	0.047	.0243832	4.099621
democratic~y	.8063885	.2067436	3.90	0.000	.3994802	1.213297
economicst~e	.0931894	.1333882	0.70	0.485	-.1693422	.355721
govperform	-.1087814	.1337057	-0.81	0.417	-.3719381	.1543752
electionsf~e	.7353362	.1750912	4.20	0.000	.3907256	1.079947
freemedia	.2349734	.1312886	1.79	0.075	-.0234258	.4933727
politicalf~m	.176594	.1513813	1.17	0.244	-.1213514	.4745393
_cons	-4.366985	3.408865	-1.28	0.201	-11.07624	2.342267

Trust in Parliament

Linear regression

Number of obs = 307
 F(16, 290) = 6.38
 Prob > F = 0.0000
 R-squared = 0.2548
 Root MSE = 2.5339

trustinpar	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
gender	-.8266137	.3135174	-2.64	0.009	-1.443672	-.2095558
age	.0172515	.0106142	1.63	0.105	-.0036392	.0381422
religion	.5515172	.4617249	1.19	0.233	-.3572395	1.460274
income	.0375599	.0818018	0.46	0.646	-.1234405	.1985604
addincome	-.1416894	.3146205	-0.45	0.653	-.7609186	.4775397
citizenkos~o	1.380066	.7421664	1.86	0.064	-.080649	2.840782
minority	1.206929	.6843456	1.76	0.079	-.1399852	2.553843
educ	.1732694	.2423592	0.71	0.475	-.3037365	.6502754
discrimina~d	-.0846584	.4974089	-0.17	0.865	-1.063648	.8943308
voteffor	.8795763	.3383347	2.60	0.010	.2136735	1.545479
democratic~y	.231662	.0644098	3.60	0.000	.104892	.358432
economicst~e	.0329584	.0506746	0.65	0.516	-.0667782	.1326949
govperform	-.0316698	.050378	-0.63	0.530	-.1308228	.0674831
electionsf~e	.1960967	.0580078	3.38	0.001	.081927	.3102664
freemedia	.0616861	.0514022	1.20	0.231	-.0394826	.1628548
politicalf~m	.064288	.052743	1.22	0.224	-.0395197	.1680957
_cons	-2.562052	1.298958	-1.97	0.050	-5.118634	-.0054709

Trust in Politicians

Linear regression

Number of obs = 307
 F(16, 290) = 7.85
 Prob > F = 0.0000
 R-squared = 0.2668
 Root MSE = 2.1574

trustinpol	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
gender	-.4817863	.2671415	-1.80	0.072	-1.007568	.0439957
age	.0148586	.0094102	1.58	0.115	-.0036622	.0333795
religion	-.1956586	.4485839	-0.44	0.663	-1.078551	.6872342
income	-.0918677	.0675716	-1.36	0.175	-.2248607	.0411253
addincome	-.5061109	.293064	-1.73	0.085	-1.082913	.0706912
citizenkos~o	.7141443	.4698202	1.52	0.130	-.2105454	1.638834
minority	.245462	.5439127	0.45	0.652	-.8250549	1.315979
educ	-.0080253	.2045263	-0.04	0.969	-.4105695	.3945189
discrimina~d	.0737929	.4941085	0.15	0.881	-.8987005	1.046286
voteffor	.4939293	.3116626	1.58	0.114	-.1194781	1.107337
democratic~y	.240272	.0565052	4.25	0.000	.1290598	.3514842
economicst~e	.0411744	.0374424	1.10	0.272	-.032519	.1148677
govperform	.0161193	.0383295	0.42	0.674	-.05932	.0915585
electionsf~e	.1700895	.0490246	3.47	0.001	.0736003	.2665787
freemedia	.0576648	.0388277	1.49	0.139	-.018755	.1340846
politicalf~m	.0269103	.0442318	0.61	0.543	-.0601457	.1139663
_cons	-1.153377	.9706633	-1.19	0.236	-3.063815	.7570612

Trust in Political Parties

Linear regression

Number of obs = 307
 F(16, 290) = 6.43
 Prob > F = 0.0000
 R-squared = 0.2212
 Root MSE = 2.3166

	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
trustinpp						
gender	-.1838907	.2803319	-0.66	0.512	-.7356338	.3678524
age	.0165274	.0095923	1.72	0.086	-.002352	.0354068
religion	-.0559104	.5265337	-0.11	0.916	-1.092222	.9804017
income	-.039322	.0696322	-0.56	0.573	-.1763706	.0977266
addincome	.127736	.3207871	0.40	0.691	-.5036302	.7591022
citizenkos~o	.5649209	.513579	1.10	0.272	-.4458939	1.575736
minority	.1290728	.6421126	0.20	0.841	-1.134719	1.392865
educ	.3875472	.2104741	1.84	0.067	-.0267033	.8017978
discrimina~d	.1356965	.5983009	0.23	0.821	-1.041866	1.313259
voteffor	.5340225	.3195667	1.67	0.096	-.0949416	1.162987
democratic~y	.1931848	.0639581	3.02	0.003	.0673039	.3190656
economicst~e	.0185768	.042696	0.44	0.664	-.0654566	.1026101
govperform	.0049135	.0404731	0.12	0.903	-.0747448	.0845718
electionsf~e	.1934224	.0550629	3.51	0.001	.0850487	.301796
freemedia	.02139	.0439673	0.49	0.627	-.0651454	.1079255
politicalf~m	.1001293	.0509912	1.96	0.051	-.0002303	.200489
_cons	-2.28828	1.0029	-2.28	0.023	-4.262166	-.314394

Trust in Legal System

Linear regression

Number of obs = 307
 F(16, 290) = 8.12
 Prob > F = 0.0000
 R-squared = 0.1938
 Root MSE = 2.5608

	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
trsutinls						
gender	-.2912076	.3597833	-0.81	0.419	-.9993252	.41691
age	-.0110187	.0112078	-0.98	0.326	-.0330777	.0110404
religion	-.4570261	.7678207	-0.60	0.552	-1.968234	1.054182
income	-.0153785	.0808268	-0.19	0.849	-.17446	.143703
addincome	-.4419878	.3203818	-1.38	0.169	-1.072556	.1885805
citizenkos~o	1.52343	.566767	2.69	0.008	.4079322	2.638929
minority	.6361421	.8277259	0.77	0.443	-.9929698	2.265254
educ	-.1279366	.2902621	-0.44	0.660	-.6992241	.4433509
discrimina~d	-.7340011	.4616238	-1.59	0.113	-1.642559	.1745566
voteffor	.1544741	.3582425	0.43	0.667	-.5506109	.859559
democratic~y	.1412697	.0649214	2.18	0.030	.0134929	.2690465
economicst~e	.0004798	.0464821	0.01	0.992	-.0910052	.0919648
govperform	-.0981444	.0465645	-2.11	0.036	-.1897916	-.0064973
electionsf~e	.1757276	.0585231	3.00	0.003	.0605437	.2909114
freemedia	.0942325	.0478595	1.97	0.050	.0000366	.1884285
politicalf~m	-.0147337	.0562235	-0.26	0.793	-.1253916	.0959242
_cons	1.636724	1.375389	1.19	0.235		

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POLICY REPORTS

Policy Reports are lengthy papers which provide a tool/forum for the thorough and systematic analysis of important policy issues, designed to offer well informed scientific and policy-based solutions for significant public policy problems. In general, Policy Reports aim to present value-oriented arguments, propose specific solutions in public policy – whereby influencing the policy debate on a particular issue – through the use of evidence as a means to push forward the comprehensive and consistent arguments of our organization. In particular, they identify key policy issues through reliable methodology which helps explore the implications on the design/structure of a policy. Policy Reports are very analytical in nature; hence, they not only offer facts or provide a description of events but also evaluate policies to develop questions for analysis, to provide arguments in response to certain policy implications and to offer policy choices/solutions in a more comprehensive perspective. Policy Reports serve as a tool for influencing decision-making and calling to action the concerned groups/stakeholders.



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